In his latest analysis for World Politics Review, Simeon Tegel argues that the Shield of the Americas, the Trump administration’s Western Hemisphere security coalition, is driven more by ideology than by a serious plan to combat organized crime. 

He points first to its membership: Mexico and Brazil, both led by leftists, are left out, even though eight of the 24 groups the coalition labels narco-terrorist are Mexican. Its first visa revocations included Bolivia’s attorney general, who was overseeing a case against an Argentine campaign strategist with MAGA ties, and a Peruvian judge who had ruled in favor of the Chinese state-owned company that operates Peru’s Chancay megaport. 

Because the Shield is not a treaty, it has also expanded into rare earths, which he reads as a sign that displacing China is a core motive, even though China is South America’s largest trading partner and Peru trades far more with Beijing than with Washington. He adds that most members, Trump included, have records of weakening the public institutions experts say any durable anti-crime strategy needs. The irony, he argues, is that Trump’s lawlessness has helped China present itself as Latin America’s reliable, rules-based economic partner.

Hey. Not sure if its the right subreddit to ask but I've been trying to find a debate on Youtube where someone confronts Glenn Diesen or his arguments but no luck.

Specifically looking for a response to his rabidly anti-Ukraine rhetoric

Prize courts sound like a relic of 19th-century warfare, but their possible revival raises a very current IR question: how far can legal institutions be used as tools of economic and military coercion?

This piece looks at the history of prize law, its role in blockades and neutral shipping, and why the US is considering bringing it back in the context of Iran. It also explores the wider implications for a future conflict involving China.

The part I found most interesting is the tension between using law to strengthen wartime pressure and the risk of setting precedents other states could later use themselves.

Legally, a government receiving military support keeps the authority to make its own decisions. In practice, political independence and freedom of action are not always the same thing.

Take a country that depends on an ally for weapons, intelligence, air defence or the upkeep of its equipment. The ally may have no formal role in its peace negotiations, yet its decisions about continuing or cutting that support shape the choices available.

How much of that dependence turns into political leverage? If the assistance can be replaced, the supplier's influence is limited. If it can't, withholding it becomes a credible threat, especially when the recipient believes losing it would seriously weaken its position.

The supplier has something to lose too. It may fear a military defeat, regional instability, damage to its credibility or consequences for its own security, and that gives the dependent country room to resist. Dependence doesn't automatically buy control over peace negotiations, particularly when both governments have a lot at stake.

The harder problem is telling genuine leverage from influence that only appears to exist. If a government accepts a settlement after its ally threatens to reduce assistance, how do we determine how much that threat mattered compared with battlefield developments, domestic political pressure or the terms of the settlement itself?

Pointers on how IR scholars handle this distinction in asymmetric alliances, where dependence is substantial but political objectives don't fully coincide, would be welcome.

IR is a way of understanding how nations behave and why they behave a certain way and given the UN charter and the human rights laws accross the world. Is IR the right subject to understand the nature of human rights ? Or is some other subject better

I’m a late-bloomer who wasted childhood and puberty and didn’t pay any attention to anything interesting. It to me a long time to find some interest in media. After graduating high school, it took me 2 years to get to my country’s equivalent of community college which was focused on media. Then I went to private university to get bachelor’s degree in media studies which I was supposed to only finish in 1 years. Not because I procrastinated too much, I had to prolong it twice and finished it after 3 years.

I’m 27 now. I finished my bachelor’s degree last month. I have no skills or practical experience. But recently found interest in reading about different countries and politics because I decided to relying on social media misinformation.

I strongly consider getting master’s degree in international relations or something very close to that. The problem is that there’s only one university that’s close enough for me to save money on dorm or tuition in case I decide on private school. And the universities have different conditions of acceptance.

And I’d turn 30 before I finish it. Since I have no particular skills to get a job that’s not dead-end, I’ll probably need to find some part-time willing to let me learn.

The issue is that it’s gonna be a hardship if I decide to study. What I’m asking on this sub, should I?

What would be my options for a late-blooming manchild in his late 20s who got master’s degree in international relations at the age of 30 and would that be worth it? How many positions to fill are there?

In a new analysis for World Politics Review, Olajumoke Ayandele argues that Rwanda’s 10-year deal to host Formula 1’s African Grand Prix, the sport’s first race on the continent since 1993, is a genuine economic and soft-power opening whose payoff is far from assured. 

Amnesty International has called it sportswashing, and allegations of rights restrictions at home and of abuses involving Rwandan forces and the M23 militia they support in eastern Congo have raised questions about the partnership. She notes, though, that Formula 1 controls access and sets the commercial terms, so Rwanda is joining a system it does not run, while the sport gains a foothold in an underserved market of an estimated 100 million fans. Hosting also departs from Rwanda’s earlier strategy of sponsoring European soccer clubs, because it brings tourism and business into the country itself. 

Precedents cut both ways. Las Vegas and Singapore drew large economic activity, but South Korea, India and Malaysia lost their races to losses, disputes and costs. With the Bugesera circuit unbuilt and the financial terms undisclosed, the analysis says much depends on whether African firms, rather than established international ones, win the contracts and skills the race creates.

Every time I see discussion around nuclear weaponry it's almost guaranteed that America, Russia and China will be name dropped 100%

India, Pakistan and Israel have a good chance of showing up in the conversation too

But Britain and France I have never seen be brought up in such discussions

Am I just looking in the wrong place's?